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Abstract
The extent to which English law remedies injury to autonomy (ITA) as a stand-alone 
actionable damage in negligence is disputed. In this article I argue that the remedy 
available is not only partial and inconsistent (Keren-Paz in Med Law Rev, 2018) but 
also gendered and discriminatory against women. I irst situate the argument within 
the broader feminist critique of tort law as failing to appropriately remedy gendered 
harms, and of law more broadly as undervaluing women’s interest in reproductive 
autonomy. I then show by reference to English remedies law’s irst principles how 
imposed motherhood cases—Rees v Darlington and its predecessor McFarlane v 
Tayside Health Board—result in gender injustice when compared with other auton-
omy cases such as Chester v Afshar and Yearworth v North Bristol NHS Trust: A 
minor gender-neutral ITA is better remedied than the signiicant gendered harm of 
imposing motherhood on the claimant; men’s reproductive autonomy is protected to 
a greater extent than women’s; women’s reproductive autonomy is protected by an 
exceptional, derisory award. Worst of all, courts refuse to recognise imposed moth-
erhood as detriment; and the deemed, mansplained, nonpecuniary joys of mother-
hood are used to ofset pecuniary upkeep costs, forcing the claimant into a position 
she sought to avoid and thus further undermining her autonomy. The recent Singa-
porean case ACB v Thomson Medical Pte Ltd, awarding compensation for under-
mining the claimant’s genetic ainity in an IVF wrong-sperm-mix-up demonstrates 
some improvement in comparison to English law, and some shared gender injustices 
in the context of reproductive autonomy. ACB’s analysis is oblivious to the nature of 
reproductive autonomy harm as gendered; and prioritises the father’s interest in hav-
ing genetic ainity with the baby over a woman’s interest in not having motherhood 
imposed upon her.
Keywords Negligence · Actionable damage · Autonomy · Wrongful conception · 
Tort · Gender-based harm · Equality · Damages · Mansplaining
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Introduction
Reproductive autonomy cases, especially wrongful conception, can be analysed 
through two analytical prisms. One is the feminist critique of reproductive law and 
family law (including access to abortion and constructions of motherhood) (e.g. 
West 1988, 1997; Bordo 2003; Siegel 2007; Cornell 1995; Priaulx 2007; Shel-
don 2016; Sanger 2018) and of tort law, in particular, the inadequate remedying 
of gender-based harms (e.g. Chamallas 1998; Bitton 2010). A more speciic litera-
ture criticises wrongful conception cases from a feminist perspective (e.g. Morris 
2004; Priaulx 2007). The other and less obvious prism is a growing conversation on 
whether negligence law ought to and does compensate for undermining one’s auton-
omy as a stand-alone head of damages (e.g. Nolan 2007; Clark and Nolan 2014; 
Purshouse 2015, 2017; Keren-Paz 2017, 2018).
The extent to which English law (and more generally the common law world) 
compensates injury to autonomy (ITA) as a stand-alone actionable damage in the 
tort of negligence is disputed. My interpretation of the relevant cases—Rees v Dar-
lington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust,1 Chester v Afshar2—, Tracey v Cambridge 
University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust,3 Shaw v Kovac,4 Yearworth v North 
Bristol NHS Trust5 and Bhamra v Dubb6—is that English law does recognise injury 
to autonomy as actionable; however, it does so inconsistently. A look at the six most 
relevant appellate cases reveals that that they can be grouped into three categories: 
reproductive autonomy cases: Rees and Yearworth7; informed consent cases: Ches-
ter, Tracey and Shaw; and food consumption: Bhamra.
In this article, I would like to focus on the reproductive autonomy cases and argue 
that new insights could be gleaned by marrying the two analytical prisms—feminist 
critique of reproductive autonomy law and actionability of ITA—together. The anal-
ysis of Rees, and of its predecessor McFarlane v Tayside Health Board Appellants8 
reveals that not only the protection aforded in Rees to reproductive autonomy is 
inconsistent with recognition (or its absence) of ITA as actionable damage in other 
English cases (Keren-Paz 2018; cf. Keren-Paz 2007a, 2017) but that the holding 
undermines gender justice, is androcentric and is potentially discriminatory.
1 [2003] UKHL 52.
2 [2004] UKHL 41.
3 [2014] EWCA Civ 822.
4 [2017] EWCA Civ 1028.
5 [2009] EWCA Civ 37.
6 [2010] EWCA Civ 13.
7 The most important British reproductive tort case, dealing with wrongful conception, is McFarlane v 
Tayside Health Board Appellants [2000] 2 AC 59 in which the upkeep costs of an unplanned daughter, 
ifth in the family, born due to negligent vasectomy, were denied and remedy was limited to the imme-
diate costs (including pain and sufering) of the pregnancy and labour. Since a separate award for the 
undermining of reproductive autonomy was neither asked for nor awarded, I do not include McFarlane in 
the group of cases discussing ITA as actionable damage in negligence. But of course, it is indispensable 
as a reproductive tort case.
8 Ibid.
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A general look at autonomy cases reveals that the most inadequate protection of 
ITAs relates to the category of reproductive choice, and more precisely, to wrong-
ful conception. What accounts for this, beyond conceptual under-theorisation, is a 
normative diiculty: obliviousness to the nature of reproductive autonomy as a gen-
dered harm. If this thesis is correct, the inadequate protection given to reproduc-
tive autonomy under Rees is the combination of both autonomy being a devalued 
protected interest (unorthodox, contested) and a devalued right-bearer—a fertile 
woman. This is emblematic of law’s failure to adequately respond to women’s expe-
riences. I defend this view despite the fact that the only undisputed English case 
explicitly compensating ITA as actionable was in the context of failed sterilisation.9
As the discussion will reveal, Chester, Rees and Yearworth are problematic when 
looked upon in isolation and compared to each other. The protection aforded to ITA 
in these cases is patchy, inconsistent and under-theorised; the problems are both 
across categories of case law (mainly Chester and Rees) and within (mainly Rees 
and Yearworth). The conceptual deiciency, elaborated upon in Keren-Paz (2007a, 
2017), lies in glossing over the crucial distinction between the three types of ITA: 
Type 1, being deprived merely of the opportunity to consent to being moved from 
one state of afairs to another (Chester and Tracey); Type 2, a more serious injury 
of  being moved without consent to a subjectively inferior state of afairs (Rees, 
Yearworth and Bhamra); and Type 3, autonomy loss consequent upon violation of 
a previously protected interest (Shaw). This under-theorisation leads to inconsistent 
levels of protection both across and within categories and to an inverse hierarchy, 
according to which, more serious violations of ITA lead to lower damages awards 
and vice versa. Most troubling, perhaps, is the award of type 3 hefty damages (for 
the physical injury from the materialisation of the risk, deemed wrongly as a conse-
quence of the interference with the claimant’s autonomy) for type 1 (gender-neutral) 
ITA in Chester (depriving Chester of the opportunity to consent to submitting to 
treatment with its inherent risk, in circumstances she would have consented, had she 
been suiciently informed), while at the same time awarding in Rees de facto type 1 
damages (a lat conventional award relecting the loss of notional control over repro-
ductive autonomy) for very signiicant gendered ITA type 2 (the interference with 
the claimant’s life plan from having an unplanned child) and type 3 (economic costs 
of raising an unplanned child which are a consequence of undermining the claim-
ant’s reproductive choice). This illustrates the shortcomings involved in the absence 
of joined-up thinking about the damage concept in law (in particular, negligence) 
and the casuistic stumbling from case to case, which is typical of wrongful concep-
tion cases (see Cane 2004; Priaulx 2017; McCandless 2017, 36).
Under-theorisation of ITA as actionable damage and gender injustice in reproduc-
tive autonomy cases is not unique to English law.10 I will demonstrate this with ref-
erence to the recent Singaporean Court of Appeal decision of ACB v Thomson Medi-
cal Pte Ltd11 in which loss of genetic ainity was recognised as actionable damage 
9 See Keren-Paz (2018), for analysis of the six cases.
10 See Keren-Paz (2007a) for a critique of similar inconsistencies in early Israeli ITA jurisprudence.
11 [2017] SGCA 20.
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in a wrongful fertilisation case (which, I, and others (Fox 2017), see as a category 
of reproductive autonomy).12 The article concludes that while in certain aspects the 
decision is an improvement on Rees and McFarlane, ACB is marred as well by con-
ceptual inconsistencies and obliviousness to the gendered nature of reproductive 
autonomy.
Autonomy, Gender Justice and Gendered Harms
Before delving into the analysis, a few related preliminary comments are in order: 
irstly, about the meaning of autonomy; secondly, the normative desirability of rem-
edying ITA and thirdly, the meaning of gender justice and gendered harms. The 
starting point for my analysis is the understanding of personal autonomy as self-
authorship. This account, most forcefully developed by Joseph Raz, (and others e.g. 
Lindley 1986), is normatively attractive and inluential in case law13 and legal schol-
arship (see e.g. Clark and Nolan 2014; Dagan 2013). According to Raz, ‘the ideal of 
autonomy is that people should make their own lives’ and the ‘autonomous person 
is a (part) author of his own life… the vision of people controlling, to some degree, 
their own destiny, fashioning it through successive decisions throughout their lives’ 
(1988, 155–156).
The standard, liberal account of autonomy, at least as applied to tort law, focuses 
on the ability to make choices simpliciter (see e.g. Cane 1997, 234; cf. Dan-
Cohen 2002, 125). However, it is debated whether the ideal of self-authorship can 
be invoked to trigger a private law remedy for any setback to one’s choices and 
desires. To use the terminology of feminist philosopher Diana Meyers, it is unclear 
whether we ought to remedy violations of episodic autonomy, as opposed to pro-
grammatic autonomy (1987, 624–625).14 Arguably, Raz’s own conception of auton-
omy as self-authorship could be understood as programmatic rather than episodic 
(choice-centred). Remedying ITAs that undermine deeply held values—in which 
the choices undermined are positioned on the continuum somewhere between epi-
sodic autonomy, relecting ‘thoughtless desire’ (Frankfurt 1971), and programmatic 
14 A person is programmatically autonomous when she is carrying out a life plan (how do I want to live 
my life?) that embodies her own answers to a particular type of question (what kind of work do I want 
to do; do I want children? etc.). In contrast, episodic autonomy entails being able to ask ‘what do I really 
want to do now?’ in a given situation.
12 While I have written on reproductive autonomy in the past—in the context of women’s duty of care to 
their born alive child for prenatal injuries (Keren-Paz 2005, 2007b), the genealogy of this paper has to do 
with my interest in ITA as actionable in negligence. As such, ACB’s overt discussion of whether the harm 
has to be compensated as an ITA made it appropriate to examine ACB against the line of cases of ITA as 
actionable damage and (as does Fox (2017)) wrongful conception. Having said this, ACB could be exam-
ined against another line of cases dealing with mistakes relating to gametes. Some of the similarities and 
diferences between these categories of cases are examined in the last part of the paper, but I leave a full 
discussion of these issues for another day, including what interests, other than autonomy, are implicated 
by confounded procreation cases.
13 Coleman v Attridge Law (A Firm) (C-303/06) [2008] All ER (EC) 1105 [9]; CA 10064/02 Migdal v 
Abu Hannah, PD 60(3) 13 (Supreme Court, ISr, 2005) [33].
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autonomy—protects the core of self-governance,15 so that ‘people can freely make 
up their own minds about what to believe and how to live, and can then act accord-
ingly’ (Voorhoeuve 2009). Similarly, if the efects of the thwarted choice are sig-
niicant or lasting, they are more likely to afect programmatic, rather than episodic, 
autonomy.
The liberal notion of autonomy has been criticised from communitarian, femi-
nist and critical quarters as ontologically and normatively deicient (e.g. MacIntyre 
1984; Hoagland 1988; Althusser 1976, 205; O’Shea 2012; West 1988; Bordo 2003; 
and in the context of wrongful conception, Priaulx 2007). Alternative understand-
ings of ‘relational’ and ‘embodied’ autonomy have thus been ofered (Christman 
2004; Oshana 2006; Cowan 2007). At irst glance, such a critique might query the 
desirability of remedying ITA in negligence—perhaps especially from a feminist 
perspective—and raises the question of the threshold for injuries that ought to be 
compensated. I have recently normatively defended remedying ITA in negligence 
and would not repeat the argument here. A remedy for type 2 ITA is justiied if the 
choice that was undermined was based on deeply held views or pertained to core 
issues with respect to which self-authorship is especially important. Since a consti-
tutive element of type 2 ITA is the undermining of the claimant’s reliance interest, 
a remedy in negligence (and not only in contract) is called for. Where the choice 
undermined pertains to a suiciently important interest, such as determining what 
treatment to receive, even type 1 injuries ought to be compensated (Keren-Paz 
(2017)).
Currently, I would make four points. First, even in feminist and critical quarters, 
the implications of the critique of the liberal conception of autonomy for consent 
and choice are unclear (Hunter and Cowan 2007; Nedelsky 1989; West 1988). In 
particular, the notion of embodied autonomy developed mainly in the critique of 
rape law (e.g. Cowan (2007)) seems to be quite apt in wrongful conception cases, 
which are a major category of reproductive autonomy cases. Put diferently, whether 
one adopts a classic, thin, liberal conception of choice, or a thicker one, protecting 
signiicant choices, the pattern of decisions analysed below remains inconsistent and 
hard to justify. The thicker notion, which I support, is identical or very similar to 
relational or embodied concepts of autonomy. Bordo (2003, 94), for example, calls 
to shift the feminist reproductive rights discourse ‘from abstract rhetoric of choice’ 
to ‘insisting that women’s equal protection’ requires resolving ‘contradictions… 
regarding’ the extent of protecting ‘bodily integrity’ and ‘reclaiming… pregnancy 
and abortion as experientially profound events’.
Second, the thicker notion of autonomy I adopt—protecting choices that are 
informed by one’s personal beliefs, ethics, values, attitudes and world view, or which 
have a signiicant bearing on the way one leads one’s life—is immune to much of 
the critique uttered against the narrow liberal conception and is likely to assuage 
fears about the negative practical and expressive ramiications of compensating indi-
viduals in negligence for thwarted choices. Put diferently, even if compensating 
Bhamra-like cases (unwittingly consuming food, undermining one’s ethical beliefs 
15 See Chico (2011, 66), based on the inluential accounts of Gerald Dworkin and Harry Frankfurt.
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or in contrast to one’s religion) is contested, compensating a woman for negligently 
imposing motherhood upon her ought not be. The point will become clearer in the 
following discussion of gender justice and gender harms. For now, I will only note 
that Raz’s account of autonomy as authorship, which underlies my account of rem-
edying ITA, seems to be endorsed by Reva Siegel (2007, 816) and Carol Sanger 
(2018, 37) in their call to further women’s reproductive autonomy. Thus Siegal cites 
approvingly the unmistakably Razian formulation adopted in Planned Parenthood of 
Se. Pa. v. Casey16 as the basis to critique states’ intervention in women’s reproduc-
tive autonomy as undermining women’s equality: ‘The destiny of the woman must 
be shaped to a large extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and 
her place in society.’ Sanger too acknowledges that control over reproductive plans 
is connected ‘to the idea of autonomy, in the sense of vindicating a person’s self-
authorship of his of her life’ citing Raz, and that ‘this idea is already vindicated 
in the abortion jurisprudence’. It is true that Sanger entertains doubts on whether 
control is the useful framework for reproductive torts as part of her critique of Dov 
Fox’s framing of the issue (2017). However, I read her claim that the gist of the 
harm in reproductive torts (pace Fox) ‘is not the loss of control over planning but 
rather, the loss of what the plan meant to produce’ as entirely compatible with the 
two claims I make in this article. First is the analytical distinction between type 1 
injury (being deprived merely of the opportunity to consent to being moved from 
one state of afairs to another) and type 2 injury (involving a consequential loss from 
being moved without consent to a subjectively inferior state of afairs). Second is 
the normative claim that given the far-reaching consequences of interferences with 
reproductive autonomy, such interferences should be remedied by much higher dam-
ages than those given for gender neutral type 1 injury (as in Chester). Sanger also 
seems to endorse the autonomy framework as ‘perhaps running in parallel’ to focus-
ing on remedying the emotional harms of disappointed expectations in the reproduc-
tive context and on recognising pregnancy itself as an injury.
Likewise, my endorsement of a thick conception of choice, and the importance 
of protecting it, while being critical of the thin impoverished notion of choice, is 
aligned with Priaulx’s (2007) analysis of wrongful conception. Indeed, as I have 
explained in my review of her book ‘Insisting that women suing for wrongful con-
ception still have choice, albeit a diicult one, while clarifying that the defendant’s 
liability should be grounded in the fact that it subjected the woman to such a diicult 
choice—by reducing the range of options open to the claimant—is, to me, Priaulx’s 
most signiicant contribution in the book.’ (Keren-Paz 2008).
Third, especially since courts’ liberal commitment is with us to stay, we should 
develop the jurisprudence in a way that is not androcentric and discriminatory 
(Keren-Paz 2013, 145). Finally, even on its own terms of a liberal, thin conception 
of choice, the pattern of decisions does not make sense (although the decision to 
view ITA as actionable negligence does), a point I develop at the end of the next 
section while explaining the inconsistency between Rees on the one hand, and Ches-
ter or Yearworth on the other.
16 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992).
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Reproductive torts invoke autonomy in the contexts of gendered harms and gen-
der justice. Gendered harms are sufered either uniquely or disproportionately by 
one gender, and the extent to which gendered harms are adequately addressed by 
law (including tort law, which focuses on redressing wrongful harms) is a major 
part of any gender-justice inquiry. In the context of tort law, gender injustice might 
result from application of seemingly equal rules to facially non-gendered harms by 
ignoring background conditions which disadvantage women. An example would 
be rules of compensating lost earnings for personal injury which perpetuate and at 
times exacerbate women’s reduced income in the labour market (see Chamallas and 
Wriggins 2010). Alternatively, as in the case of reproductive torts or sexual abuse, 
gendered harms typically sufered by women are devalued (in diferent areas of the 
law including tort, criminal, family and constitutional law) in ways which are either 
outright discriminatory or otherwise problematic, by failing to take on board wom-
en’s interests, morality and epistemology.17
The analysis of wrongful conception (and more broadly reproductive autonomy/
torts) ofered here chimes with the following: (1) Realisation that the stakes of deny-
ing reproductive choices, especially for women, are enormous.18 This translates to 
criticising the very limited remedy ofered in Rees and to the inconsistent level of 
protection in comparison to Chester. (2) The harm in reproductive torts is mainly 
non-material and involves the undermining of decisional autonomy and its far-reach-
ing consequences, including, in particular, women’s personhood, subjectivity and 
citizenship.19 As such, redress is called for not only as a matter of autonomy but also 
of well-being (Fox (2017, 177); Sanger (2018, 36)). This translates to the need to 
recognise autonomy (at the very least reproductive autonomy) as actionable in neg-
ligence and the importance of distinguishing between types 1, 2, and 3 ITA. Indeed, 
Sanger’s critique of Fox’s conceptualisation of the harm20 becomes more intelligible 
once the distinction between the mere undermining of decisional autonomy in type 
2 cases and its consequences is well understood (Keren-Paz 2017, 420–421).21 (3) 
17 See in the contexts of: sexual harassment Bernstein (1997); image-based abuse McGlynn and Rackley 
(2017); reproductive autonomy West (1988, 1997); Bordo (2003); Priaulx (2007); Sanger (2018, 39–45) 
who notes (at 40) that ‘the measure of disappointment’ from ‘losing control over reproductive plans’ ‘is 
not gender neutral’.
18 See West (1988, 30–32, 41 (being ‘overtaken, occupied, displaced and invaded’, 47 (compulsory 
motherhood as ‘tremendously constraining, damaging and oppressive’); Bordo (2003, 93) (constraining 
women reproductive choices challenges ‘women’s status as subjects’); Siegel (2007, 819) (highlight-
ing ‘both practical and dignitary signiicance to the decisional control that reproductive rights aford 
women’); Priaulx (2007).
19 Siegel (2007); Bordo (2003, 77 (women as fetal containers, see also Annas (1986)), 85, 93 (threat to 
women’s subjectivity); West (1988, 1997, 107); Sanger (2018); Priaulx (2007).
20 Sanger (2018, 36) who describes Fox’s conceptualisation as focusing on ‘disruption to an individual’s 
procreative plans’ as opposed to Sanger’s suggestion that it ‘is not the loss of control over planning but 
rather, the loss of what the plan meant to produce’ that matters. I think that Sanger misreads Fox, in this 
regard, as he is very clear throughout, that the harm in such cases is much about the consequences (and 
hence implicates women’s well-being), a point which is also relected in his sketch of damages quantii-
cation.
21 See also Keren-Paz (2018, 418) for the similar distinction between simultaneously sufering ITAs 2 
and 3.
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Reproductive autonomy is a matter of sex equality (equal protection in US consti-
tutional terminology) and not only of liberty or privacy (Bordo 2003; Siegel 2007; 
Cornell 1995). Hence, the focus on the discriminatory aspects of the limited protec-
tion reproductive autonomy received in Rees and in ACB and on viewing cases of 
imposed procreation (to use Fox’s terminology), such as Rees, as deserving stronger 
remedy than confounded procreation, such as ACB.
Five Aspects of Gender Injustice in English Wrongful Conception 
Cases
Reproductive autonomy is gendered; negligent undermining of reproductive auton-
omy is a gender-based harm disproportionately harming women. This feature, 
beyond the conceptual under-theorisation discussed above, helps explain why the 
protection of autonomy in English negligence law is unsatisfactory. This reading of 
Rees focuses, therefore, on its nature as a reproductive autonomy case, while the 
analysis in Keren-Paz (2018) highlighted its nature as an autonomy case. If this the-
sis is correct, the limsy protection given to reproductive autonomy under Rees is the 
combination of both autonomy being a devalued protected interest/actionable dam-
age (unorthodox, contested) and a devalued right-bearer—a fertile woman.
In Rees, the claimant wished not to have children (mainly due to the fact that 
she had a genetic condition that rendered her practically blind). She underwent a 
sterilisation operation, which was conducted negligently, so unbeknown to her had 
failed. She eventually became pregnant and gave birth to a son. The House of Lords 
awarded £15,000 as a conventional award to compensate the claimant for her loss of 
reproductive autonomy not to become a parent.
Rees results in gender injustice. The irst and most troubling aspect of gender 
injustice in wrongful conception cases is courts’ refusal to legally acknowledge that 
unwanted motherhood is a ‘detriment’. The original sin lies with McFarlane, not 
Rees, although as evident from reading McFarlane, its reasoning relects commonly 
held views among judges across many jurisdictions. Such a view is based on ‘what 
is morally acceptable and what is not’ lest:
parents may be put in a position of arguing in court that the unwanted child, 
which they accepted and care for, is more trouble than it is worth … the law of 
tort has no business to provide legal remedies consequent upon the birth of a 
healthy child, which all of us regard as a valuable and good thing.22
The ‘law must take the birth of a normal, healthy baby to be a blessing, not a 
detriment.’ While individuals ‘may choose to regard the balance as unfavourable … 
society itself must regard the balance as beneicial’.23
This normative stance forces parental obligations (which are clearly gendered) on 
the mother—epitomising Robin West’s broader observation that ‘[M]ost women are 
22 Supra n 7 at 82 (Steyn).
23 Ibid at 114 (Millett).
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indeed forced into motherhood’ (1988, 71)—and is, therefore, at odds with socio-
logical, psychological and political science indings about the costs of motherhood 
(let alone of an involuntary one). Ruth Cain (2007) highlighted both the di culties 
embedded in motherhood in diferent social contexts and the opprobrium faced by 
mothers who dare to complain about mothering. Orna Donath’s study (2015) amply 
documents the biggest taboo of all: ‘regretting motherhood’; the study critically exam-
ines the cultural narration of adapting to motherhood, of which McFarlane’s rhetoric 
is a good example. Data also exists on the speciic costs of unwanted motherhood; 
compared with having an abortion, being denied one may be associated with a greater 
risk of initially experiencing adverse psychological outcomes (Biggs et al. 2017).
McFarlane’s endorsement of forcing parental obligations on the mother is incom-
patible with the normative disapprobation—in both philosophy and law, and espe-
cially at common law—of positive duties. It barely needs mentioning that in negli-
gence law itself, there is no duty to rescue, and denying the mother recourse against 
the negligent defendant in wrongful conception cases amounts to the imposition of 
such a duty. This argument is well developed in the context of the right to abortion 
(see Thompson 1971; Bernstein 2016, 2018), but is equally valid as a reason to sup-
port a duty of care in wrongful conception cases.
The second aspect of gender injustice (but perhaps also of the lawed conceptu-
alisation of ITA) is the denial of upkeep costs on the grounds that the parents bear 
the joys of parenthood so cannot expect the defendant to bear the inancial costs. 
This argument was presented in McFarlane as a matter of fairness24 and in other 
jurisdictions (notably, but not only, in the USA) as a matter of ofsetting beneits.25 
In conceptualising ITA we need to distinguish ‘between loss of autonomy result-
ing from any duty to pay for the unsolicited beneit, and loss lowing from the fact 
that the claimant’s actions in conferring what the market might regard as a “beneit” 
have put the defendant in a position that is subjectively inferior to his pre-interfer-
ence condition’ (Keren-Paz 2017, 423). The general rule within restitution law is 
that unsolicited beneits which were not freely accepted do not give rise to a duty to 
make restitution.26 For this reason, when the tortious act also conferred a beneit on 
the claimant, ofsetting the beneit is not automatic and straightforward. If a set-of 
is allowed, the claimant is subject to the defendant’s power to force on the claimant 
a transaction in which the improvement to one interest is inanced by the diminish-
ment of another interest. In order to prevent this danger, one of the conditions in 
§920 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts for allowing set-of is that the beneit is 
to the same interest undermined by the breach of duty. Only when this is the case 
does the ofsetting not involve a forced transaction on the claimant. Pace Lord Mil-
lett in McFarlane, who commented that the claimants could not be allowed ‘by a 
24 McFarlane supra n 7 [97] (Lord Hope) (and cf [105] (Lord Clyde), [113] (Lord Millett)).
25 See e.g. Custodio v Bauer, 59 Cal Rptr 463 (1967).
26 Benedetti v Sawiris [2013] UKSC 50 [18] with explicit reference to ‘the fundamental need to protect 
a defendant’s autonomy’. As discussed in the next section, even those denying remedy for wrongful con-
ception largely recognise that accepting an unwanted child is not free, given the moral, sociological and 
psychological costs of abortion or adoption.
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process of subjective devaluation, to make a detriment out of a beneit’,27 the refusal 
to allow subjective devaluation in wrongful conception cases seems unprincipled 
and possibly discriminatory.28
Denying a claim based on the parent’s accepting the child into the family is also 
incompatible with the modern near impossibility to establish the volenti defence in 
negligence and with the requirement that the claimant will consent to the risk of not 
being compensated, rather than to the risk of injury.29 By analogy, accepting paren-
tal obligations towards the unplanned child does not mean waiving the claim against 
the defendant.
The third and related aspect of gender injustice in wrongful conception cases is 
the use of distributive justice considerations—of fairness (Keating 2000) and equal-
ity (Keren-Paz 2007b)—to justify the denial of the claimants’ costs of raising an 
unplanned child.30 This ignores the obvious relevance of distributive justice, here 
gender justice, to adequately compensate for loss of reproductive autonomy, which 
is a gendered harm. As feminist thinkers have demonstrated, and was summarised 
above, this is symptomatic of law’s broader failure to understand what is at stake in 
denying women reproductive autonomy and, even more broadly, to take women’s 
experiences, morality and epistemology into account. The autonomy loss is likely to 
be much less wealth dependent than the costs of raising a child and for this reason 
too, compensating it is normatively desirable.
The one qualiication to this statement is that the mother’s career loss from having 
the unplanned child might have a socio-demographic gradient. Women in well-paid 
jobs might feel that the setback to their career is more signiicant. But here, too, care 
should be taken to distinguish between the pecuniary and non-pecuniary aspects of 
the career setback. The long-term reduction in earnings due to care responsibilities 
is unrecoverable, according to Greenfield v Irwin.31 But the fact that the claimant’s 
career was interfered with and, as a consequence, she is less able to feel fulilment 
and satisfaction, are exactly part of what an award for type 2 autonomy loss is meant 
to compensate. As long as restitutio in integrum is the controlling remedial principle 
in private law, notwithstanding its built-in regressive efects (Abel (1990)), it will 
be most untoward to deny compensation for autonomy loss that is distinctively gen-
dered in order to avoid disproportionate compensation of the better-of (cf. Keren-
Paz (2007b, 149, 175); Keren-Paz (2013, 145)).
27 Supra n 7 at 112.
28 It is beyond the scope of this article to provide a comprehensive examination of the extent to which 
restitution law’s autonomy preserving principles of free acceptance and incontrovertible beneit are or 
ought to be adopted for purposes of setting of beneits against the harms in torts damages. It suices to 
say, that, as indicated in the text, the Restatement’s doctrinal requirement of ‘same interest’ as a condition 
for such set-of advances the same value enshrined by the free acceptance requirement.
29 Nettleship v Weston [1971] 2 QB 691.
30 McFarlane supra n 7 [83] (Lord Steyn), [91] (Lord Hope) (regressive result argument); see supra, 
n 24 (fairness argument). To be sure, there is similarity between the fairness argument and the ‘moral 
repugnancy’ argument discussed above—that parental obligations cannot normatively be considered as 
a loss. But I believe that the arguments are diferent, so even if upkeep costs could be considered as loss, 
there might still be policy reasons against compensating claimants for that loss.
31 [2001] 1 WLR 1279.
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Compensating autonomy loss is still subject to the same fairness argument 
mounted against compensating upkeep costs. Since the parents bear the joys of par-
enthood they should bear the autonomy loss.32 But, of course, the set-of argument 
itself is oblivious to the value of autonomy. It is not for the defendant to force an 
unwilling claimant to become a parent and set of from the autonomy loss created 
by its negligence the joys of parenthood, which the claimant explicitly sought to 
avoid.33
Finally, note also the ironic reversal of the fairness claim in McFarlane—that it 
is unfair that the parents who enjoy the child will not bear the costs of its upbring-
ing.34 Denying the right to damages from wrongful conception claimants based on 
the social value of the family unit,35 amounts to a form of taking, or expropriation 
without adequate compensation, and is, therefore, problematic on fairness grounds. 
The reluctant parents are required to discharge obligations they sought to avoid and 
are denied compensation due to a belief that such compensation will undermine a 
socially valuable institution.
In theory, an award for undermining the parents’ reproductive autonomy could be 
given in addition to upkeep costs.36 Having an unplanned child creates both pecuni-
ary and non-pecuniary costs and, as we have seen, the policy considerations for and 
against awarding them are quite diferent. Pecuniary costs have a wealth gradient 
(rich parents are likely to recover more) and are largely not gendered37; non-pecuni-
ary costs, i.e. autonomy loss, have the reverse pattern.
Historically, the conventional award was probably developed as a ‘consolation 
prize’ given the refusal to award child-rearing costs. The Law Lords might have 
felt that sending the claimant away empty-handed was inappropriate. It should also 
be recalled that the claimants did not plead compensation for their autonomy loss 
(which is unsurprising given the fact that this interest was not traditionally protected 
by the tort of negligence). But now that the interest has been recognised (Nolan 
2007, 73–77), and even more, (as discussed below) given the award of type 3 dam-
ages to type 1 injury in Chester, it is time to protect the interest in reproductive 
autonomy in a more principled and comprehensive manner.
A fourth aspect of gender injustice is manifested in Lord Millett’s insistence that 
the award be given in equal share to both parents.38 This is odd. While unplanned 
parenthood signiicantly undermines the father’s autonomy, it typically undermines 
much more the mother’s for the following reasons: childcare is still overwhelmingly 
38 Rees supra n 1 [124].
32 Supra n 24.
33 See text to supra n 26.
34 See supra n 24.
35 See especially Lord Millett’s view cited in supra n 23; cf. references in ACB supra n 11 [92] to the 
family being ‘the basic unit of society’.
36 This would be the equivalent of awarding type 2 and type 3 damages cumulatively, a debated possibil-
ity in Israeli case law. See Keren-Paz (2018), n 108.
37 However, since there are more women than men in single-parent families the pecuniary loss is some-
what gendered. Indeed, there is much to be said for allowing child-rearing costs in cases where the 
patient is a single parent, who is typically on quite a low income (cf. Amirthalingam 2018, 17).
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performed by women (Graycar and Morgan 2002, 267; Schober 2010, 13–22); social 
construction of parents’ roles is gendered (Sanchez and Thomson 1997, 748–749; 
Bass 2015, 364–365); the relative importance associated with one’s role as a par-
ent vis-à-vis other social roles is likewise gendered (Thompson and Walker 1989, 
864; Nilsen et al. 2013, 134–135). In a sense, Millett’s obliviousness to all this is 
just another manifestation of the problem, which is discussed immediately below, 
of compensating type 2 injuries by means of a conventional award. After all, the 
interference with reproductive autonomy is likely to cause diferent quanta of losses 
to diferent women. However, in theory, one could come up with two gendered con-
ventional awards with diferent sums, relecting the unequal distribution of childcare 
responsibilities with their corresponding efect on autonomy (cf. West 1988, 31; 
Priaulx 2007; Sanger 2018, 40). So, the problems are, in fact, separable.
The ifth aspect of gender injustice is the deviation from the principle of full 
compensation and the setting of a very low amount for the conventional award. This 
is problematic both in itself and compared to Chester and Yearworth.
Chester and Rees: Wrongly De‑prioritising Type 2, Gendered, Injury
In Chester, Afshar negligently failed to warn Chester of a small inherent risk in the 
procedure she undertook and the risk materialised. There was no negligence in the 
way the procedure was undertaken and, had Chester been warned, she would have 
delayed her consent but eventually would have undergone the procedure. Despite 
the fact that the breach of duty—the failure to inform Chester of the risk—did not 
increase the chance that the injury would materialise, Chester was fully compensated 
for the consequent physical injury in order to vindicate her interest in autonomy.39
Taken together, the holding in Rees and Chester raises three problems.40 First, a 
conventional award in Rees is a deviation from the principle of full compensation 
and, as such, is inconsistent both with Chester and with the rest of English remedies 
law. Leaving aside this inconsistency, one might still doubt whether the award to all 
mothers in wrongful conception cases should be standardised, ignoring important 
diferences between them. For one thing, the motivation for not wishing to have a 
child might have a bearing on the signiicance of the intrusion (cf. Fox 2017; Pur-
shouse 2017). For example, thwarting a inancially motivated decision seems less 
intrusive than thwarting a motivation to avoid the burden of raising children.41 And 
of course, individual circumstances will inluence the ‘opportunity cost’ of hav-
ing an unplanned child. For example, the efect of the caring responsibility on the 
mother’s educational and career choices would difer (and depend also on her age, 
39 Chester supra n 2 at [86] (Lord Walker); [16] (Lord Steyn); [22] (Lord Steyn); [55] (Lord Hope); [87] 
(Lord Hope); cf. at [24] (Lord Steyn) and [101] (Lord Walker).
40 For a fuller analysis see Keren-Paz (2018).
41 See Bevilacqua v Altenkirk [2004] BCSC 945 in which the diferent parents’ motivations led to an 
award of $30,000 to the mother and $20,000 to the father.
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socio-demographic background and available support). A conventional award does 
not accommodate any of these factors.42
Secondly, Rees is also conspicuous for the paltry amount given as compensation 
(or vindication). This is problematic.43 The injury in Rees ought to be considered at 
the higher end of violation of one’s autonomy in terms of the context (reproductive 
autonomy, which raises issues of sex equality) and its long-lasting and ever-present 
consequences.44 The idea that £15,000 is suicient to either vindicate the claimant’s 
choice not to become a parent, or to compensate her for the profound efects of this 
intrusion on her life is shocking indeed.
Thirdly, Chester erred by giving in efect a type 3 damages (for physical injury) 
for a type 1 injury (loss of opportunity to consent which would have been given 
had it been asked): As a type 1 injury, damages should be on the lower side of the 
spectrum since the claimant would have conceded to undergo the procedure with the 
associated risk. This means that (1) there is no causation between the breach of duty 
to disclose the risk and the physical injury and (2) the ITA itself is less serious than 
in type 2 cases (a subjectively inferior state of afairs post intervention), in which the 
choice is more signiicant. After all, in type 2 the claimant would not have agreed to 
be moved from the pre-intervention to the post-intervention state of afairs, while so 
agreeing (had she been asked) in type 1.
Taken together, then, Chester awarded type 3 damages for a type 1 injury, i.e. 
where the breach of duty did not cause the physical injury in seemingly a non-gen-
dered context of informed consent.45 In contrast, Rees failed to award type 3 dam-
ages (upkeep costs and forgone income in the labour market as a result of caring 
responsibilities) and, in addition, failed to give full compensation for ITA type 2 
(undermining the claimant’s life plan by thrusting motherhood upon her). By this, it 
devalued perhaps the most signiicant type 2 injury (forced motherhood) by giving 
in efect a type 1 remedy (for the notional undermining the claimant’s reproductive 
autonomy), which is both of exceptional nature (a conventional award) and extraor-
dinarily low.46 If at all, type 1 injury (as in Chester) is more amenable to a conven-
tional award, since claimants in this category complain only of the fact that they 
were deprived of the possibility to say yes, not of being subject to an inferior state of 
afairs, where harm will naturally vary from one claimant to another.
42 A point lost on LJ Davies in Shaw supra n 4 [72].
43 For critique see e.g. Priaulx (2007, 73–76); Morris (2004, 16). For an understanding of the award as 
vindication see Wilcox (2012, 405); Varuhas (2014, 269–270).
44 Both aspects were documented above in the gendered harms section.
45 It is possible, however, that even outside of the reproductive context, there is still a gendered pat-
tern of breaching more often the duty to attain female patients’ informed consent. Cf. Keren-Paz (2007a, 
228–235), examining the desirability of type 1 damages awards from an egalitarian perspective.
46 These two critiques should be distinguished. A signiicantly higher conventional award could have 
better relected the profound undermining of such a fundamental aspect of one’s autonomy but would 
still be of an exceptional nature and fail to cater for the diferent efect of forced motherhood on diferent 
claimants.
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Rees and Yearworth: His and Her Reproductive Autonomy Awards?
A look at the two reproductive autonomy cases—Rees and Yearworth—reveals quite 
a diferent treatment of ITA (cf. Koenig and Rustad 1995). In Yearworth v North 
Bristol NHS Trust, damages for mental distress were held to be available (subject to 
proof of factual causation) as a consequence of learning that the claimants’ sperm 
had been negligently destroyed by the defendant, which had undertaken to look after 
the claimants’ sperm with all possible care. The court based this conclusion on two 
factors: (1) characterising the relationship between the claimants and defendant as 
gratuitous bailment; and (2) the applicability to bailment of contractual damages for 
mental distress in cases where an object of the contract was to provide peace of 
mind.47
As I explain in Keren-Paz (2017), despite facially being a type 3 (mental injury 
consequent on property loss), type 2 is the more accurate classiication. The nub of 
the litigation was the lost chance to become a father (and the fear resulting from that 
loss, even if the claimant subsequently regained fertility), which is clearly a type 2 
injury related to one’s reproductive autonomy. Indeed, the court itself understood 
the claim in this way, by noting that the purpose of the arrangement was ‘the provi-
sion to the men of non-pecuniary personal or family benefits. Any award of damages 
should relect the realities behind these arrangements and their intended purpose’.48
The defendant’s breach of duty in Yearworth obviously interfered with the repro-
ductive autonomy of those claimants who did not regain their fertility. There is much 
to be said (on grounds of consistency) for the applicability of the conventional award 
in Rees, irrespective of the availability of damages in bailment for mental distress. 
Elsewhere (Keren-Paz 2018), I have noted ive issues to be resolved in terms of 
examining the consistency between the two cases. Here, I will focus on those impli-
cating gender justice: (1) whether a remedy for the ITA should accumulate (in both 
cases) with damages for mental distress—otherwise, it seems that men’s interest in 
reproductive autonomy is protected to a greater extent than women’s; (2) whether a 
standalone remedy for undermining reproductive autonomy (as distinct from dam-
ages for mental distress) should be a conventional award (to be consistent with Rees) 
or adhere to the principle of full compensation (given the critique ofered above of 
the conventional award); and (3) how, ideally, the quantum for ITA in Yearworth 
(foregone fatherhood) should compare with that of Rees (imposed motherhood).
Could the claimants recover for both ITA and psychiatric injury or distress? 
It is useful to distinguish between diferent groups of claimants. Firstly, there 
are claimants who did not regain fertility, who ought to recover for ITA even if 
they did not sufer psychiatric injury (or even distress, if ITA is to be measured 
47 Yearworth supra n 5 [49, 56–58].
48 Ibid [57] (my emphasis). The care the court took to analyse the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Act 1990 also supports this conclusion. But for current purposes, not much hangs on accepting as correct 
my claim that the court itself viewed the claim in Yearworth as based on ITA 2. What matters is that the 
case ought to be understood as protecting reproductive autonomy, and hence be condemned for the ensu-
ing inconsistencies with Rees.
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irrespective of the distress it causes49); otherwise, the type 3 award in Yearworth is 
under-inclusive.50 Secondly, claimants who sufered psychiatric injury ought to be 
compensated for that loss. Crucially, to be non-discriminatory, such entitlement—
which to be recalled is extended also to those sufering merely mental distress fall-
ing short of psychiatric injury—should inhere with Rees-like claimants.51 This is 
especially so, given the enormity of harms stemming from forced motherhood, the 
judicial tendency to misunderstand or belittle these harms and the need to respect 
reproductive rights in a manner consistent with sex equality, as discussed above.
While the McFarlane court refused to normatively view unplanned motherhood 
as detriment, there is evidence suggesting that postpartum depression is more likely 
when the child is unplanned (Biggs et al. 2017). Surely, the decision in Yearworth 
commands that the actual costs of postpartum depression should be remedied with-
out being capped by the £15,000 conventional award. As Bauer et al. (2014, 4) have 
found, the average cost to society of one case of perinatal depression is around 
£74,000, of which £23,000 relates to the mother and £51,000 relates to impacts on 
the child.52 However, if imposed motherhood is normatively deemed to be a joy53 
(to the extent it is used to ofset upkeep costs) what normative space is left to com-
pensate mothers for the distress or, at times, postpartum depression which follows 
imposed motherhood?
The second issue raises an important and general jurisprudential question of the 
relationship between coherence and justice. Both Rees- and Yearworth-like claim-
ants should receive full compensation for the interference with their reproductive 
autonomy. To the extent that a standalone ITA award in Yearworth would have been 
set above £15,000 while the Rees limitation stands, I would see this as problem-
atic as both inconsistent and based on feminist critique of devaluing women’s inter-
ests (West 1988, 1997; Siegel 2007; Priaulx 2007). Indeed, that the actual award 
the claimants in Yearworth are likely to receive far exceeds £15,000 is problematic 
in terms of gender equality. This relates to the last issue that, in applying Rees, one 
needs to decide whether interference with reproductive autonomy by denying par-
enthood is more, less or as serious as an interference imposing parenthood. One also 
needs to decide whether these harms are gendered and, if so, whether this ought to 
be relected in the size of the award. These questions have to be answered, even if 
the decisions in Rees and Yearworth are corrected, so that all types of interference 
49 Space constraints do not allow discussing this important point. An analogy to Gulati v MGN Ltd 
[2015] EWHC 1482; af’d [2015] EWCA Civ 1291 (CA) might suggest a positive answer. Israeli courts 
are in disagreement. See also (in a type 1 context) Keren-Paz (2007a, 198–200).
50 Claimants who sufered psychiatric injury, from the belief they would not be able to father children, 
prior to regaining fertility, who therefore did not sufer permanent ITA, should also be compensated.
51 In wrongful conception cases, mental distress occasioned on the pregnancy and birth (as opposed to 
rearing the child) could be recovered under McFarlane supra n 7.
52 Note, however, that this does not necessarily mean that the quantum of damages which is due to the 
mother (if liability is established) exceeds £15,000.
53 Not all of the judges who have denied claims for wrongful conception have normatively deemed 
motherhood to be a joy—some have argued that the beneits and burdens cannot be calculated.
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with reproductive autonomy would be remedied according to the principle of full 
compensation.
These are diicult questions and space constraints prevent me from attempting to 
answer them—any attempt to sketch answers would not do justice to the complex-
ity of the issues. Interestingly, neither Fox (2017) in his 91-page article focusing on 
both imposed and denied parenthood, nor Sanger (2018) in her comment on Fox, 
attempted to answer these questions. I will merely make three points. The common 
law’s animosity towards the imposition of positive duties might suggest that, as a 
starting point, imposed parenthood should be taken as a more serious wrong than 
denied parenthood. If this is accepted, the remedy in Yearworth being (seemingly) 
more generous than that in Rees is inconsistent with the system’s basic principles 
and manifests androcentric bias (cf. Bernstein 2018).
However, this starting point is likely to be seriously contested, not least from 
some feminist strands (e.g. a certain understanding of relational feminism). West 
(1988, 53) highlights the experiential contradiction between women both valuing 
intimacy and dreading the intrusion and invasion which intimacy implies (while 
men have a similar contradiction between autonomy and alienation). This account 
might be the foundation upon which the answers to these questions from a feminist 
perspective could build.
Finally, any such answers should avoid the pitfall of adopting the existing andro-
centric measure in Yearworth as the anchoring point for determining the proper rem-
edy for imposed motherhood. This goes back to both the tension on which I have 
commented in my previous writings between coherence and the attainment of sub-
stantive justice (Keren-Paz 2013, 2017) and, more broadly, the limits of law as a 
transformative, progressive tool (the ‘master’s tools’ problem).
A Comparative Perspective: ACB v Thomson Medical Pte Ltd
Both under-theorisation and gender blindness mar the recent Singaporean decision 
of ACB. The case involved a negligent mix-up of genetic material in an IVF process; 
as a result, the baby daughter born had no genetic ailiation to the father and this 
was apparent due to her darker skin tone. The Court of Appeal approved the lower 
court’s rejection of the claim for upkeep costs and held that injury to autonomy is 
not an actionable damage per se. However, ‘a loss of autonomy may underlie a more 
specific award of damages in the context of a negligent interference with the plain-
tif’s reproductive plans’.54 Such a loss was manifested in losing genetic ainity with 
the baby. Damages should be substantive and individualised (i.e. not a conventional 
award as in Rees); and for practical reasons, the damages could be set as a percent-
age of the upkeep costs. The court decided that in this case the award should be 30 
percent of the upkeep cost and remanded the case for that cost to be calculated.55 
54 Supra n 11 [115].
55 Ibid [150]. The court also denied the availability of punitive damages on the facts of the case while 
leaving them as a rare possibility for claims in negligence.
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The decision is very rich and could easily be the subject of a standalone article. 
In what follows, I will comment very briely on directions for future analysis and 
will focus on how ACB compares with English decisions in terms of a consistent 
approach to protecting autonomy in negligence and of a gender analysis of reproduc-
tive torts. As we shall see, such evaluation would view ACB as a mixed bag.
As in English cases, ITA is not fully recognised in ACB as actionable damage. 
The reasons aforded in the decision—conceptual, coherence and over-inclusiveness 
objections56—are unconvincing, and nothing in the reasoning undermines my recent 
conclusion (with which the court did not engage) that ITA ought to be recognised as 
actionable damage (Keren-Paz 2017, 425–437). But of course, not all ITAs ought to be 
remedied and reproductive autonomy seems to be protected in the decision, which is 
commendable. On the positive side, three aspects of the decision are an improvement 
on the decision in Rees and are in line with the critique ofered above: that the award is 
individualised, so consistent with the principle of full compensation57; substantive, so 
not derisory58; and that the court appreciates that the main costs of unwanted parent-
hood are not pecuniary.59 This indicates that the court correctly understands under-
mining reproductive autonomy as a serious type 2 ITA and while the typology is not 
explicitly present, some of the court’s analysis hints at its existence and relevance.60
On the negative side, as in English cases, there is hardly any overt appreciation 
that reproductive harms are gendered and that this might be relevant to the extent 
to which we deem the harm worthy of being actionable.61 Given the overall length 
of the decision—136 pages—and the depth in which other policy considerations 
were treated, the obliviousness to gender equality considerations is disappointing.62 
Moreover, endorsing the equation of maintenance (upkeep costs) with loss of earn-
ings (consequent on care responsibilities)63 is oblivious to the gendered nature of the 
latter (but less so the former) loss.
The case raises two other (and related) diiculties, which are absent in wrongful 
conception cases but cannot be addressed here. First, a potential critical race critique 
that the decision in fact views a diferent race (or more speciically a darker tone) 
56 Ibid [115–124].
57 Ibid [141–142, 145].
58 Ibid [148].
59 Ibid [18, 107].
60 See in particular ibid [122, 130].
61 For example, the term parenthood is cited in the case more than 30 times; motherhood only once—a 
quotation from a previous (English) case essentialising motherhood ‘unnatural rejection of womanhood 
and motherhood would be generously compensated’. The closest appreciation of the issue as gendered 
is a reference at [70] to LJ Hale’s speech in Parkinson v St James and Seacroft University Hospital NHS 
Trust [2001] EWCA Civ 530 noting the ‘consequences arising out of the unplanned pregnancy (which, as 
she noted, were many and varied and which she described in powerful detail)’.
62 It could be argued that selecting ITA in reproductive torts as actionable damage against the general 
rule disqualifying ITA as actionable damage is an example of gender sensitivity so that the gendered 
nature of the harm operated as a ‘hidden persuader’. Even if this were true, the failure to give gender jus-
tice its proper due in the policy debate is problematic.
63 Supra n 11 [104].
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baby as injury64; and secondly, the limits of choice. It is one thing to accept that 
having an unwanted child is an injury; it is another to accept that having a child with 
diferent characteristics than you wished is. While I support an award for ITA 2 in 
ACB as appropriate, I posit that even those disagreeing could still support a signii-
cant award of damages in wrongful conception cases.
In terms of inconsistencies, I will limit my comments to the following three 
(although there are more). First, some of the reasoning leading the court to reject 
the upkeep costs and ITA as generally actionable (even if convincing on their own 
terms) undermines the court’s recognition of reproductive autonomy, manifested 
in absence of genetic ainity, as actionable. If claimants ‘consciously choosing’ 
to have genetic ailiation through IVF is a suicient reason to hold the negligent 
defendant under a duty to compensate them,65 why is the conscious choice not to 
become a parent not a reason to compensate them for the upkeep and non-pecuniary 
costs (which were denied), and the interference with their autonomy (which was left 
as an open question)?66 Or conversely, if pecuniary (and non-pecuniary) costs are 
irrecoverable since they are ‘about the consequences to the Appellant qua mother of 
the existence of the child and the concomitant … relationship … [entailing] legal, 
moral, and social obligations to care for, support, and nurture’67 how is it that the 
claim for undermining genetic ailiation, also ‘qua mother’, is recoverable?
Secondly, in a twist to the normative ‘birth-cannot-be-a-loss’ argument, the court 
explains that ‘parental obligations’ are based on a ‘custodial relationship between 
parent and child and a relationship of trusteeship between the parents and wider 
society’. ‘Neither of these relationships gives rise to obligations which are capable 
of valuation as “loss” in any meaningful sense’,68 inancial or care-based.69 How-
ever, the fact that a voluntary undertaking is a cornerstone condition for a iduciary 
duty70 should have led the court to reject the conclusion that parental obligations 
‘are not capable of characterisation as a loss’,71 since ‘the Appellant did not, in fact, 
have any choice in the matter’.72 On either of the following variants of the argument, 
imposed parenthood ought not block parents from seeking compensation for their 
losses: either that imposed parenthood cannot be based on a trusteeship relationship 
(since it is not voluntary), or that seeking damages from the party whose negligence 
64 The court (ibid at [131]–[135]) addressed this diiculty, quite convincingly in my opinion, by refer-
ence also to Sally Sheldon’s analysis (2011) of the Northern Ireland case of A and B by C v A Health and 
Social Services Trust [2011] NICA 28. In A and B, the claim was framed as harm due to being born with 
a diferent skin colour than the parents and was denied. Sheldon criticises ‘reducing the alleged harm to 
irrelevant physical variation’, for failing to give voice to the true harm that was sufered and ignoring the 
social context of likely racially based bullying of the child and questioning of the mother’s idelity (cf. 
McCandless (2017); and, in the US context, Fox (2017, 231–234)).
65 Supra n 11 [129].
66 Ibid [136].
67 Ibid [87].
68 Ibid [90].
69 Ibid [91–92].
70 See Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1, 18; Finn (1977, 9).
71 Supra n 11 [90].
72 Ibid [84].
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created forced trusteeship does not undermine the nature of the parental obligation 
and is compatible with it. Indeed, it hard to see why conceptually or symbolically, 
let alone practically, seeking compensation from a third party is incompatible with 
the parent’s duty to the child. In practice, such a right will only improve the parent’s 
capacity to discharge the obligation to the child (cf. Keren-Paz 2007b, 147–148).
Thirdly, the commendable realisation that focusing ‘on the inancial conse-
quences of the birth is … inadequate … [and] misleading’73 is undermined by meas-
uring the ITA as a percentage of upkeep costs (cf. Purshouse 2017, 15; Amirthal-
ingam 2018, 18). Besides being conceptually arbitrary, and returning pecuniary 
costs to centre stage, such a rule is regressive, by extending the wealth-dependent 
character of upkeep costs (used as an argument against awarding them in McFar-
lane)74 to ITA, and symbolically ofensive, by suggesting that the value (measured 
by upkeep costs) of a baby with lower genetic ainity is lower than a value of a baby 
with full genetic ainity (this also undermining the court’s insistence that the hold-
ing does not denigrate adoption75).
Finally, it is unclear whether the court will allow recovery for wrongful concep-
tion in which there is no undermining of genetic ainity. In terms of ITA, however, 
it will be odd to compensate parents who wanted a child with genetic ainity to both 
parents but due to negligence had a child genetically ailiated only with the mother 
but to refuse compensating parents who did not wish to raise a child at all (cf. Pur-
shouse 2017, 15–16; Fox (2017, 226, 231–233). Surely, the ITA is more signiicant 
in the latter case? (Unless, for the court, the gist of the damage was reputational i.e. 
the apparent lack of genetic ainity due to the diference in skin tone.76 As men-
tioned above, such a proposition is normatively contested).
A related diiculty is that in ACB the mother received damages for lessened 
genetic ailiation with the baby, despite the fact that she is genetically ailiated to 
the baby. This raises interesting questions about privity and scope of liability (cf. 
Amirthalingam 2018, 20), and from a feminist perspective could be criticised as 
androcentric and patriarchal. The interest recognised by the law as so deserving 
compensation is the father’s interest in genetic ailiation with the child, although 
this interest is dressed up as the mother’s interest in having a child genetically aili-
ated to her husband. Moreover, symbolically, the inference that damages connote a 
devaluation of the speciic child born seems to be stronger in wrongful fertilisation 
in which the parents wanted a child, but not this one, than in wrongful conception, 
in which the parents did not wish for a (or an additional) child at all (cf. Amirthal-
ingam 2018, 19).
73 Ibid [107].
74 Supra n 34.
75 Supra n 11 [129].
76 Ibid [131–134].
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Conclusion
The only English case explicitly compensating injury to autonomy as action-
able in negligence is Rees, in the context of failed sterilisation. As the discus-
sion demonstrated, however, rather than celebrating Rees as a feminist judgment, 
we should lament it as demonstrating gender blindness and androcentrism when 
examined both for itself and compared to Yearworth and Chester. To begin with, 
Rees was decided against the background of McFarlane, which denied upkeep 
costs due according to general principles, based on distributive justice consid-
erations; in so doing, it was oblivious to the fact that gender-based distributive 
considerations support a substantial remedy for the gendered harm of wrongful 
conception. The denial of substantive remedy undermined the mother’s auton-
omy, arguably in a discriminatory manner, by setting of, contrary to principle, 
deemed joys imposed on the mother (non-pecuniary beneit) against the upkeep 
costs (pecuniary damage). Worst still, in doing so, the court refused to legally 
acknowledge that unwanted motherhood is a ‘detriment’, mansplaining to the 
woman who explicitly sought not to become a mother that she is deemed to enjoy 
the experience.
The decision in Rees, to award damages for the signiicant ITA type 2 involved 
in becoming a mother involuntarily, could have been laudable but the following 
facts make Rees a Pyrrhic victory to hopefuls of gender justice in tort law: that 
what was awarded was (a) a conventional award deviating from the principle of 
full compensation, (b) a derisory amount of merely £15,000 and (c) according to 
Lord Millet an equal amount is due to the father.
In the broader context of Chester and Yearworth the picture only becomes 
gloomier. A gender-neutral type 1 ITA, which is much less serious, receives in 
Chester inlated type 3 remedy, while the signiicant gendered type 2 ITA of 
becoming an involuntary mother receives a lower award. Worse still, English law 
seems to remedy more favouringly type 2 injury to reproductive autonomy when 
the claimants are men, than when they are women. Mental distress from the fear 
of being negligently deprived from being a father is not subject to a conventional 
award of low value, while damages for the signiicant, life changing consequences 
of undermining a woman’s autonomy by negligently thrusting motherhood upon 
her are capped.
From a comparative perspective, certain aspects of the ACB holding are an 
improvement, namely, individualised and substantive award and (in theory) being 
appreciative that the main costs of unwanted parenthood are non-pecuniary. 
Beyond internal inconsistencies in the decision which were highlighted above, the 
reasoning is problematic from a gender justice perspective in two related aspects. 
First, it seems to prioritise lack of genetic ainity (having a much-wanted child, 
but from the wrong father) over imposed motherhood as a greater undermining 
of autonomy. This seems odd and representative in undermining the signiicance 
of unplanned motherhood on the claimant’s ability to be the author of her life 
story. Secondly, the interest recognised by the law as so deserving compensation 
is the father’s interest in genetic ailiation with the child, although this interest is 
1 3
Gender Injustice in Compensating Injury to Autonomy in English…
dressed up as the mother’s interest in having a child genetically ailiated to her 
husband. Such interest should not be looked down upon, but its remedying hardly 
stands as a feminist triumph, especially in the context in which a right for sub-
stantive damages for imposed motherhood is yet to be recognised.
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